Long Term Evaluation Advanced (LTE-A) is the third generation partnership project for cellular network that allows subscribers to roam into networks ( i. e., the Internet and wireless connections) using spacial purpose base-stations, such as wireless access points and home node B. In such LTE-A based networks, neither base-stations, nor the Internet and wireless connections are trusted because basestations are operated by un-trusted subscribers. Attackers may exploit these vulnerabilities to violate the privacy of the LTE-A subscribers. On the other hand, the tradeoff between privacy and authentication is another challenge in such networks. Therefore, in this paper, we propose two anonymous authentication schemes based on one-time pseudonymes and Schnorr Zero Knowledge Protocols. Instead of the international mobile subscriber identity, these schemes enable the user equipment, base-stations and mobility management entity to mutually authenticate each others and update the location of the user equipment without evolving the home subscriber server. The security analysis demonstrate that the proposed schemes thwart security and privacy attacks, such as malicious, international mobile subscriber identity catching, and tracking attacks. Additionally, our proposed schemes preserve the location privacy of user equipment since no entity except the mobility management entity and Gate-Way Mobile Location Center can link between the pseudonymes and the international mobile subscriber identity. Also attackers have no knowledge about international mobile subscriber identity. Hence, the proposed schemes achieve backward/forward secrecy. Furthermore, the performance evaluation shows that the proposed handover schemes impose a small overhead on the mobile nodes and it has smaller computation and communication overheads than those in other schemes.
INTRODUCTION
As a promising packet-based system, and envisioned toward forth generation cellular networks, the Long Term Evaluation Advanced (LTE-A) system is developed through the Third Generation Partner Project (3GPP) to enhance network's Quality of Service, including [1] : 1) increasing 
RELATED WORK
The importance of the UE privacy preserving in the LTE-A networks attracts the researchers providing work for handling its problems [7] [8] . The ideas of anonymous authentication and location privacy schemes are divided into three main categories: encrypting IMSI, using dynamic identity, and using pseudonymes.
For encrypting IMSI, in [9] , Abdo et al. address the IM-SI capturing as privacy problem in LTE network authentication protocol. Therefore, they proposes a self-certified scheme called (SP-AKA) based on the public key cryptography to encrypt the IMSI during their transmission. However, the linkability between two transmitted identity is still a privacy problem. In [10] , Sanaa Taha and Xuemin Shen consider the anonymity and location privacy of mobile node in the case of heterogenous networks. They consider the location privacy preserving of mobile node as a problem faced the seamless roaming via heterogenous networks. Therefore, authors introduce anonymous home building update scheme for mobile IPv6 wireless networking. In this scheme, authors achieve mutual authentication and share a symmetric key between two anonymous network entities. In [?] , So-In figured that the IP-based architecture of the 4G networks bring several problems such as mobility, multi-homing and location privacy. Therefore, they introduce a proxy protocol as a modification of the standard mobile IPv6 protocol. In this scheme, authors uses virtual identity to achieve location privacy. However, proxy protocols allow home entity to delegate a privilege to other entity in order to sign on behalf of the home entity. Therefore, the presence of impersonating attacks still a big problem faced the delegation authority. In [11] , Tuan Ta and John Baras prove that the paging procedure of LTE network suffers a lack of location privacy problem. Therefore, they suggest to embed the user identity information of the mobile into the transmitted signal properties that carry the paging information. However, this scheme requires a modification of the signal recognition in the physical layer, which is not desirable in the network.
For dynamic identity-based privacy schemes, in [12] , Hamandi et. al. consider the AP and the Internet connection as untrusted entities. Therefore, attackers, such as active and passive attackers, may disseminate through those untrusted APs and Internet connections to violate the privacy of the UEs. For the purpose of UE privacy preserving, [12] employs a dynamic identity instead of using the traditional IMSI to create the pseudonyms (W-AKA). However, in this scheme, the Home subscriber Server (HSS) entities should initially or periodically be met in each authentication process causing a big overhead on the network. Furthermore, Despite this scheme achieves the forward secrecy, the backward secrecy is not achieved since the next pseudonyms generated by the previous one. Moreover, the IMSI should be transmitted in clear text at the registration process, which makes the IM-SI linkable. Additionally, In [13] , Gier M. Koien, proposes a privacy enhanced mutual authentication scheme for LTE networks using identity based cryptography. Author considered the privacy of the UE may violated by the tracing attack since these attacks could link the sequence of temporary identities of UE. Therefore, authors used the public key encryption technique using dummy IMSI to make the temporary identity unlinkable and withstands the tracing attack. However, this scheme increases the number of messages required to perform the authentication, therefore, it consumes the bandwidth of the network. In [14] , Jo et. al. consider the the requirement of achieving location privacy of mobile node causes a big performance problems such as high communication, computation cost and huge revocation list. Therefore, authors introduce a privacy preserving scheme based on the identity based sign-encryption. However, authors claimed that the computation cost is a big problem and back to use the bilinear pairing which is well-known consume much time . Moreover, this scheme is not suitable for LTE-A network. The LTE-A authentication scheme is done between UE and MME with participating of the eNB which does not function as merely connecting between two entities.
For pseudonymes-based privacy schemes, [15] , Hamandi et. al. propose pseudonymes in authentication scheme (HSK-AKA) to achieve the privacy of the IMSI. However, this scheme consumes the bandwidth of the network since the proposed authentication scheme should arrive to the HSS. Moreover, the network entities , MME and UE, has no ability to check the correctness of the pseudonymes; therefore, malicious attacker is still a problem. In addition, in [16] , Choudhury et. al., consider the permanent identity may cause the UE trackable. Therefore, they propose a pseudonym-based authentication scheme to preserve the privacy of the IMSI. However, the proposed authentication scheme should arrive to the HSS which requires more bandwidth consumption. Moreover, the proposed scheme depends on a new set of functions which may not be suitable to the infrastructure of the LTE network. Moreover, in [17] , Purkhiabani et. al use the pseudonym to preserve the privacy of the IMSI in the LTE authentication scheme. However, the traceable attack is still a problem since attackers can link between the two permanent pseudonym. In this paper, we propose a pseudonym-based scheme to achieve IMSI privacy with considering the above drawbacks in our novel scheme.
SYSTEM MODEL

Network Model
The architecture of the LTE-A network is mainly composed of two components as depicted in Fig. 1 : the evolved packet core (EPC) and evolved universal terrestrial radio access network (E-UTRAN) [18] . The evolved packet core represents the wired part in the network, which is responsible for the overall control of UEs and the bearer establishment. Each entity in the evolved packet core has a responsibility as follows: the MME manages bearer and connection, and the HSS maintains the user subscription data and MME's identities. Packet data network gateway (PDN GW) performs mobility and inter-networking within the 3GPP and non-3GPP technologies respectively. A policy control and charging rule function (PCRF) entity is employed to control decision making of flow and Quality of Service [18] . GMLC is the LTE-A core network entity which is responsible for location services such as location selection, location cache, retrieval of global positioning system reference data from external global positioning system reference data [18] . The Base Station (BS) is the hardware connected to the mobile phone network that communicates directly with UEs. LTE-A supports three types of BS: 1) Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network Node B, also known as Evolved Node B, (eNB), is the element in Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network of LTE, 2) Home eNB is a special purpose BS installed in a specific area such as office or small building to enhance the service in this area, and 3) the Access Point is the base station of the wireless local area network. HeNB and AP are connected to the LTE-A network via The Internet [18] . Once the UE switches on, it runs an acquisition procedure to identify the nearby BSs and discover how they are configured. In doing so, UE accepts the primary and secondary synchronization signals, and reads the system information of each BS to select the closest one in order to initiate authentication and key agreement procedure over it.
The authentication procedure (EPS-AKA), Fig. 2 , is the mobility procedure that is already implemented in the 3GPP release 9 for LTE networks to perform the mutual authentication and key agrement between network entities. EPS-AKA protocol works as follows [19] [20]:
1. A UE sends an access request message to the MME.
2. Upon receiving a request, the MME launches an authentication procedure by asking the UEs identity (IM-SI).
3. In response to the MME, the UE sends its identity (IMSI).
4. The MME sends an authentication data request message containing IMSI to the HSS for acquiring the authentication vectors.
5. The HSS first generates authentication vectors for the MME, an authentication vector comprising a random number, challenge number, authentication challenge and symmetric key (KASME) instead of an integrity key, and cryptographic key.
6. The HSS sends back an authentication data request message including the generated authentication vector (for the corresponding UE), so that the MME is authorized to authenticate the requesting UE.
7. Upon receipt of authentication vectors, the MME sends random number and authentication challenge piggybacked on authentication request to the UE, enabling the ME to verify the correctness of sequence number and compute the response.
8. The UE verifies the correctness of the sequence number by computing message authentication code and comparing it with the message authentication code carried in the authentication challenge message. If the two message authentication codes are matched, the UE computes and sends the corresponding response back to the MME in an authentication response message.
9. Once the MME receives and verifies response correctly, it chooses the corresponding KASME as the session key to protect its communication with the UE. In addition, the UE calculates its KASME accordingly.
Adversary and Trust model
Andrea et. al., in [21] , analyze the vulnerabilities of the LTE networks and list number of risks related to the privacy of UE such as identity privacy and user location tracking. Therefore, in this paper, we consider that internal and external attacks may exploit the vulnerabilities of the LTE-A to violate the identity and location privacy of the subscribers as follows: 1. Internal attacks: Attacker, who is a legitimate administrator of the HeNB or AP, may use their legitimacy in a malicious way to exhaust the subscriber's privacy. For example, malicious security authorities could install eNB or AP inside their buildings, in such a way when a guest visits a buildings, the authority owned the base station compels the visiting UE to initiate authentication process by sending signal strength more efficient than the outside eNB. After completing this process, the BSs administrator denies the service for this UE by queuing their IMSI to the black list. This attacker succeeds by employing the UE's identity (IM-SI) that is transmitted clearly in the authentication process [22] .
2. External Attacks: Attackers, who is not a network's entity, could violate the privacy of the LTE-A subscribes by exploiting the Internet and wireless connectivity. We define the following attacks as external attacks:
A) CIM SI Catching Attack: the LTE-A authentication process starts with the identification process, which is designed to transmit the IM SI in plain text over the communication link, wired or wireless, in the case of no temporary identity is valid [23] . Adversaries can catches the IMSIs from the E-UTRAN or the Internet communications, which are well known insecure links [24] and lunch the replay man in the middle attacks B) Tracking attacks: In the initial attachment procedure, UE uses the IMSI to authenticate itself to the network. In the next mobility procedure, UE uses a temporary identity (TMSI). An adversary can link between the IMSI and TMSI using the location information introduced in the attachment procedure. Therefore, the advertises can reveal the real IMSI and trace the UE [24] .
We assume that the evolved packet core is secure and trusted to other network entities, because they are owned and controlled by the operator who is interested in the secure operation of the network. In addition, the HSS, MME and the GMLC are not vulnerable to attacks because they are not accessible to subscribers. However, we do not trust the evolved universal terrestrial radio access network part of the LTE-A network because the HeNBs and APs are owned and operated by the subscriber rather than the service providers and the eNBs are deployed in streets and physically can be accessed to public. We consider the BSs are connected to the evolved packet core via insecure links, which bring new risks to the LTE-A network management, but the links between evolved packet core entities are secure.
PRELIMINARIES
This section describes the schnorr zero knowledge protocol since the technical part of the proposed scheme depends on. Schnorr zero-knowledge protocol is a cryptographic authentication technique allows entity to demonstrate knowledge of secret to another entity without revealing any useful information about the secret [25] [26] . Schnorr zero-knowledge protocols security depends on the difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem and mainly has three security properties as follows:
• Completeness: The verifier will convinced of the fact by the prover if and only if the statement introduced by the prover is true.
• Soundness: If the verifier denies the correctness of the statement introduced by the prover, no cheating prover can convince the verifier otherwise. • Zero-Knowledge: If the statement is true, no cheating verifier learns anything other than this fact.
Fig . 3 describes the schnorr zero knowledge protocol. The protocol has mainly four public parameters p,q,α, and β. p, q are two large prime numbers where p − 1 is divisible by q. α is the generator of finite field G(p) and β = α (p−1)/q mod p. Schnorr zero knowledge protocol is running as follows:
1. Entity A choose two random commitments a, r, where 1 <= a, r <= q − 1, computes X = β r mod p, and V = β −a mod p. A sends B a witness with X and V .
2. B sends A a challenge e, where 1 <= e <= q − 1 3. A computes response y = a.e+r mod q and responds response y to A.
4. B computes z = β y .V e mod p and accepts if z = x, rejects otherwise. the prove of correctness is illustrated bellow: z = β y .V e mod p = β a.e+r .β −a.e mod p= β a.e .β r .β −a.e mod p= β r = X.
PROPOSED SCHEMES
In this section, we describe the proposed schemes as follows:
P-AKA Scheme
In this subsection, the proposed anonymous authentication and location privacy preserving scheme that works based on pseudonyms (P-AKA) is presented.
A) System Initialization: HSS bootstraps the system by using a finite field Fq with a large prime number q for initializing a multiplicative cyclic groups of points G over an Elliptic Curve E and g is the generator of G. HSS adapts two collision resistant hash functions H and H1 where H : {0, 1} * → Fq and H1 : {0, 1} * → G. HSS chooses a random number γ, γ1 ∈R F * q , W = g γ , (u, v)= H1(W, γ1), U = g u , and V = g v . Finally, HSS considers the P KH = {g, W, U, V } as the public key, and publish G, q, g, P KH over the network. For each element i in the network (U E and BS), HSS initializes a secret key aski = (Ai, xi), where xi ∈R F * q and Ai = g the asku, P Ku and CIM SIu securely to the corresponding UE by encrypting as illustrated in Equation .1. These parameters using advanced encryption standard algorithm and private key of the HSS, the purpose of AES encryption is to withstand the eavesdropping attacks and the purpose of private key encryption is considered as a signature to ensure integrity and non-repudiation, to the corresponding node and also distributes γ2 to each Mobility Management Entities (M M E s).
B) Anonymous authentication: Fig. 4 decries the flows of the pseudo-auth scheme, it is done in six steps as follows:
1. U E picks a set of random numbers r1, α, rα, rx, r δ ∈R F * q , q is not secret, it is known to the network, computes
U r δ , and c = H(g r 1 1 ||T1||T2||R1||R2||LAi||T Si) , where T Si is a time stamp generated by the U Ei to ensure the freshness of the message. LAi is the current location of the U Ei. U Ei computes sα, sx, s δ , and the signature σi as illustrated in Eq. 2,3,4 and 5, respectively. Finally, as illustrated in Fig. 4 , U Ei sends authentication request to the BSj.
2. BSj checks T Si to verify the freshness of the message. Stale message are dropped. Then, it computesR1 = 
3. M M E k checks T Si to verify the freshness of the message. Then, it computesR1 =
, the prove of correctness is illustrated as Eq.8. M M Ej sends location update request to the GM LC as illustrated in Fig. 4 . Fig. 4 , M M E k sends authentication response to the BSj 5. BSj checks T S to verify the freshness of the message.
Then, it verifies the signature of the
If the verification is corrects, BSj compute a aggregated signature σ jk = E ask j (σ k ). Finally, as illustrated in Fig. 4 ,sends a confirmation request to the U Ei 6. U Ei checks T S to verify the freshness of the message. U Ei computes KASMI = H(g r 1 r 2 ), and ch = H(kASMI , 1). Then, it verifies the aggregated signature of the BSj and M M E k as σjk
.If the verification is correct, U Ei ends the procedures, otherwise, U Ei returns the paging procedure.it is correct, UE does not trust the BSs and the wireless medium, therefore, UE should verify the authenticating of the BS by checking the signature. if the verification is not correct mean some problem happened such as attacks or false BS
SZN-AKA Scheme
In this subsection, we will describe the proposed anonymous authentication and location privacy preserving scheme that works based on schnorr zero knowledge proof (SZN-AKA), which is composed of three phases; system initialization, Anonymous authentication, and CIMSI extraction as follows:
A) System Initialization: HSS, the capital entity in the LTE-A network, bootstraps the system by using S-ZNK protocol with large prime number p such as p − 1 is divisible by another large prime number q. HSS selects random number α as secret key, where 1 < α < q and computes public key β = p α mod q. For each UE, x, HSS selects a random number r and computes CIM SIx = p rx mod q. For each node ,x, of the network, HSS chooses random number askx as a private key and computes public key P Kx = p askx . HSS dismiss p, q, β to all network entities and transmit r to the corresponding U E in a secret manner, also HSS sends α to the GM LC. HSS sends the askx, P Kx and CIM SIx securely to the corresponding node by encrypting these parameters using the advanced encryption standard algorithm (AES) and private key of the HSS, the purpose of AES encryption is to withstand the eavesdropping attacks and the purpose of private key encryption is considered as a signature to ensure integrity and non-repudiation as as illustrated in Eq. 9 to the corresponding node. Finally, each node in the network dismiss its public key to network and keeps the private key secure.
B) Anonymous authentication: 1. U Ei selects δi, ωi and T Si as two random numbers less than q and time stamp, respectively. U Ei computes Xi and Vi as illustrated in Equations 10 and 11, respectively. U Ei sign the message by signature σi as described in Eq. 12. U Ei sends a witness request; wit − req; (Xi, Vi, T Si, σi), to the corresponding the BSj.
2. Once BSj receive the message, it verifies the signature of the U Ei as DP K i (σi) ?= Xi, Vi, T Si. if the verification is correct, BSj computes the aggregated signature σij= E ask j (σi). BSj sends a witness request; wit−req(Xi, Vi, T Si, σij) to the M M E k .
3. Once M M E k receives the message, it verifies the correctness of the aggregated signature DP K j (DP K i (σij)) ?= Xi, Vi, T Si. if the verification is correct, M M E k selects challenge e, 1 < e < q, computes σ k = E ask k (e, T Si), and sends challenge request; chall − res(e, T Si, σ k ) to the BSj.
4. BSj verifies the correctness of M M E k signature DP K j (σ k ) = e, T Si. if the correctness is satisfied, BSj computes the aggregated signature σ kj = E ask j (σ k ) and sends challenge request message chall − res(e, T Si, σ kj ) to the U Ei 5. Once U Ei receives the challenge request, it checks the aggregated signature as DP K j (DP K k (σ kj )) = e, T Si. If the verification is correct, U Ei computes challenge yi , the temporary IM SI T M SI, and sign by the signature σi as described in Equations 13, 14 and 15, respectively. Finally U Ei sends a challenge response; chall−res(yi, T M SI, LAi, T Si, σi) to the BSj. yi = (δie + ωi)modp (13)
6. BSj checks the signature σi as DP K i (σi) = yi, T M SI, LAi, T Si. If the verification is satisfied. BSj aggregates the signature σij = E ask j (σi), and sends challenge response chall − res; (yij, yi, T M SI, LAi, T Si, σij) to M M E k . 7. M EE k verifies the aggregated signature σij as DP K j (DP K i (σij)) = yi, T M SI, LAi, T Si. if the verification is correct, M M E k checks the correctness of challenge yi as Xi = β y i V e i , the proof of correctness is illustrated bellow in Eq. 16 if yi is true then M M E k sends location update request Locup; T M SI, LAi to the GM LC. 
CIM SI = (T M SIX
−1 i V e i ) −α (17) = (β r+y i X −1 i V e i ) −α = (β r β y i X −1 i V e i ) −α = (β r β δeω X −1 i V e i ) −α = (P rα β δωe β −ω β −δe ) −α = CIM SI
SECURITY AND PRIVACY EVALUATION-S
This section describes the security and privacy evaluation of our proposed schemes. In order to prove that, we want to analyze the possibility of attacks for violating the communication security and revealing the location privacy of the UE.
Communication Security
Both of pseudo-auth and SZN-auth schemes achieve the communication security requirements by using two aspects; time stamps (TS) and signature. Each message of the proposed schemes is attached with T S in order to deny any internal or external of reusing the message. T S consists of the date and the time of the message initiation as mm/dd/yyyHH : M M : SS.
Signature is the process that allows a network entity to sign message and any other entity can verify this messages with completely ascertainably that this signature never be made by entities except the legal one.
Our schemes withstand these types of attack by signature as; when the attacks catches the messages, he tries to take one of the two possibility. In one hand, attacker attempts to change one of the message content without changing signature. Therefore, the other side fails to verify the signature as the variety of the transmitted variable and the computed variables causing message rejection.
on the other hand, attacker tries to extract the private key of the network node to sign the new message. To reveal the private key, attacker has to try an exhaustive search with at least half of the key size. Based on [27] , if n/2 >= 80, where n is the size of secret key, then it is infeasible to break the security of the system. Therefore, we can say that our schemes withstands the exhaustive and birthday attacks. Table. 2 describes a security comparison between the proposed scheme and the others.
In P −AKA scheme, let us consider the first message of the our scheme, auth-req; auth−req.; T1, T2, g r 1 , sα, sx, s δ , LAi, c, σi, T Si. Insecure wireless, Internet connectivity, and the heteroge- 
= 2
80 to link pseudonymes. In SZN-auth scheme, challenge, yi, is the third level of security that our scheme achieved. yi is computed based on e, ω, and δ, and challenge e has been sent securely from M M E k using the signature. ω and δ are two random number that are not been sent before.
Location Privacy Preservation
Location privacy is defined as the ability to prevent attackers form deducing a user's location [28] . In both proposed schemes, P − AKA and SZN − AKA Scheme, attacker has no capability to deduce the U Ei since the IMSI of the U Ei is not transmitted over transmission media. Also, attackers has no capability to corrupt the transmitted message by modifying the U Ei location, LAi, since it is included in the assigned message, which is secured by the signature. Therefore, we do not need to hide LAi since the transmission of the LAi is meaningless.
Likability is the process of revealing the CIMSI by links a two transmitted messages. In pseudo-auth scheme, attacker has no capability to reveal the IMSI using the likability properties, since a new T1 and T2 are used based on a new pseudonymes numbers as r1, α, rα, rx, r δ ∈R Fp, computes
U r δ . Therefore, we do not need to hide LAi since the transmission of the LAi is meaningless since the attacker has no capability to link between the LAi and the identity of the U Ei. In SZN − AKA Scheme, attacker has no capability to reveal the CIM SI using the likability properties, since a new T M SI is generated based on a new pseudonymes numbers as δ and ω.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we analysis the performance of the proposed scheme by comparing it with the other schemes.
Communication Overhead
For communication overhead, as illustrated in Table 3 , the proposed schemes, P − AKA and SZN-auth, achieve the authentication and key agreement protocol by number of messages, 4 and 7 respectively, while the EP C − AKA, W − AKA and HSK − AKA schemes perform the purpose by 9, 5, and 6 messages respectively. By the other hand, the size of the messages of the proposed schemes, P − AKA and SZN-auth, are 4480 bits and 395 bits respectively, while the EP C−AKA, W −AKA and HSK−AKA schemes consume 3072 bits, 2245 bits, and 2016 bits respectively. However, the proposed schemes achieve a security level higher than the other schemes. Moreover, unlike the other schemes, the proposed schemes does not require the HSS evolving in the authentication and location update procedures, Therefore, the proposed schemes decrease the overhead on the core network since it does not need to arrive HSS. 
Computation Overhead
According to the security cryptographic namespace coded in visual studio.Net 2012, compiled with Microsoft Visual Basic .Net 2012, and run in a device with Intel(R) Core(TM)i7-4510U CPU@2.00GHz 2.60 GHz, 16 GB RAM and 46-bit operating system x64-based processor, the computation overhead of the cryptographic algorithm being used in our scheme are computed as the following: single MD5 and SHA256 hash functions consume 4 and 5 millisecond, respectively to hash 5 bytes, AES and ECC consumes 20 and 1 millisecond to encrypt 5 bytes, the single modulus operation consumes 0.005 millisecond to consumes to relocate a large number to the finite field and finally, any MILENAGE cryptographic algorithms, the cryptographic algorithms being use in LTE-A network to generate the security parameters [?], consumes 36 millisecond to generate LTE-A security parameter such as integrity key, response, and confidentiality key.
As illustrated in Fig. 6 , the proposed schemes consume a computation overhead less than those consumed in the EP C − AKA, W − AKA and HSK − AKA since the proposed schemes depend on low computation cryptographic tools such as MD5 hash function, ECC encryption, and modulus operation, while the EP C − AKA, W − AKA and HSK − AKA schemes depend on the MILENAGE cryptographic algorithms and SHA256 hash function. Through the use of an algorithm, information is made into meaningless cipher text and requires the use of a key to transform the data back into its original form. Despite the EP C − AKA transmits the IMSI in clear text, it consumes a computa- tion time in computing the the security parameters such as AVs. Each registration process, the authentication and authorization and accounting server computes five authentication vectors (AVs) for the MME and UE computes at least one AV. The computing of these AVs is done based on a special purpose cryptographical functions which use advanced encryption standard as the kernel function [29] .
Consider MD5 hash function, SHA256, AES encryption, ECC encryption, cryptographic function and modulus operation consume Ψ, Ω, ξ, Υ, µ and ∆ computation time. Table . 4 describe the time required for each network node such as UE, eNB, MME and HSS to execute the authentication protocol.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we describe the experimental results of the proposed schemes. By using the security cryptographic namespace, we use the visual studio .Net to develop a network simulation platform running in a device with Intel(R) Core(TM)i7-4510U CPU@2.00GHz 2.60 GHz, 16 GB RAM and 46-bit operating system x64-based processor. The experimental results that we had measured focuss on the total routing delay and the individual network nodes include UE and HSS. We consider number of UEs attached to the network as 1, 25,50,75 and 100 in the presence of 20% of attacks and number of eNBs and MMEs as only one in the network. Based on [30] , we consider the LTE-A average network ratio delay of the authentication protocol is one second, the physical network is the LTE-A network. Table 5 shows our simulation parameters. Our experimental results are presented as the following:
Total Network Authentication Delay
The total network authentication delay is defined as the overall time required to execute the authentication protocol all over a network. Figure .7 illustrates the total delay (in second) for different number of UEs. It is clear in the figure that our schemes, P −AKA and SZN −AKA, attain better delay computation overheads than those of other schemes. On one hand, Our P − AKA protocol requires the execution of twenty modulus operations, six MD5 hash function and and eight ECC public key encryption for signature. Additionally, our SZN −AKA protocol requires to execute fifteen modulus operation, three MD5 hash function and eight EC-C public key encryption for signature. On the other hand, Moreover, in our network model, we consider 20% of the UEs as attacks, therefore, our schemes are capable to settle these attacks in the first verification check on the eNB by signatures and time stamps, and hence decrease the routing time. However, other schemes allow these attackers to consume more routing delay for instance the EP C − AKA consumes a time of five MILENAGE cryptographic function before the HSS deny the attack, also the W − AKA and HSK − AKA consume a time of five SHA256 functions and three MILENAGE cryptographic functions before HSS deny the attack. As a matter of fact, with the increasing number of devices that need to execute the authentication protocol, the EP C − AKA, W − AKA, and HSK − AKA may bring a big computation overhead risk to the LTE-A network.
In conclusion of this experiment, the simulation results demonstrate that our schemes, P − AKA and SZN − AKA, enhance the total network authentication delay compared to those of other schemes, EP C − AKA, W − AKA, and HSK − AKA, as the following: first, P − AKA enhances the total network authentication delay by 85.809%, 85.89%, and 89.75% compared to EP C − AKA, W − AKA, and HSK − AKA schemes, respectively. Second, SZN − AKA enhances the total network authentication delay by 93.97%, 93.97%, and 95.61% compared to EP C − AKA, W − AKA, and HSK − AKA schemes, respectively.
Node Routing Delay
In this subsection, we compute the authentication overhead of each node at the network include UE and HSS as follow:
UE Delay: According to our scenario, when UE roams to a network that 20% of their entities are seam to attacks, the UE should make a complex computation to authenticate itself to other entity and should verify the other entity correctly. Figure . 8 illustrates that our schemes introduce less UE side authentication delay than that introduced in the EP C − AKA, W − AKA, and HSK − AKA schemes, In our schemes, P − AKA and SZN − AKA, each message that are routed via the network should signed by the sender and equipped with time stamps. Therefore, UE could verify the correctness of the message before running heavy computation, and hence fake messages are settled. As a matter of fact, with the increasing number of messages that need to execute the authentication protocol in the UE side, the EP C − AKA, W − AKA, and HSK − AKA can not verify the correctness of the message early, and hence may bring a big overflow risk to the UE device.
In conclusion of this experiment, the simulation results demonstrate that our schemes, P − AKA and SZN − AKA, enhance the authentication delay at the UE side compared to those of other schemes, EP C − AKA, W − AKA, and HSK − AKA, as the following: first, P − AKA enhances the authentication delay at the UE side by 95.22%, 92.16%, and 92.16% compared to EP C − AKA, W − AKA, and HSK − AKA schemes, respectively. Second, SZN − AKA enhances the total network authentication delay by 95.22%, 92.16%, and 92.16% compared to EP C − AKA, W − AKA, and HSK − AKA schemes, respectively.
HSS Delay According to our scenario, our schemes, P − AKA and SZN − AKA, require HSS to only pre- pare the overall system at the registration stage, therefore, HSS does not require to involve each authentication protocol. the original LTE-A authentication protocol, EP S − AKA, requires HSS to compute five MILENAGE cryptographic functions. W − AKA and HSK − AKA schemes require HSS to compute three MILENAGE cryptographic functions and three SHA256 hash functions. Therefore, as illustrated in figure 9 , our schemes, P − AKA and SZN − AKA, introduce better HSS authentication delay than that introduced in the EP C − AKA, W − AKA, and HSK − AKA schemes.
In conclusion of this experiment, the simulation results demonstrate that our schemes, P − AKA and SZN − AKA, enhance the authentication delay at the HSS side compared to those of other schemes, EP C −AKA, W − AKA, and HSK − AKA, as the following: first, P − AKA enhances the authentication delay at the HSS side by 93.68%, 89.68%, and 89.7% compared to EP C − AKA, W − AKA, and HSK − AKA schemes, respectively. Second, SZN − AKA enhances the total network authentication delay by 93.07%, 89.69%, and 89.69% compared to EP C − AKA, W − AKA, and HSK − AKA schemes, respectively.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce entailing two Anonymous authentication and location privacy preserving scheme for LTE-A network. In the first scheme, P −AKA, we use pseudonymes based public key cryptography to perform the authentication procedure because the finite field used in the public key cryptography has a prime number big enough to be secure, also the public key cryptography has a difficulties hard enough to withstands attacks such as the discrete time logarithm which we use in this scheme.
In the second scheme, SZN − AKA, we study enabling Anonymous authentication and location privacy preserving scheme for LTE-A network using aggregated schnorr zero knowledge protocol and the public key cryptography to perform the authentication and location update procedure.
Our schemes can eliminate the overhead of core network since the authentication procedure does not need to arrive to the HSS each time. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that our proposals are preserve the privacy of the location of the U E and require low communication and computational overhead.
The experimental results demonstrates that our schemes element the total time delay required to execute the authentication protocols comparing with the other schemes. Also, the exterminate result demonstrates that our scheme decreases the time of authentication protocol by decreasing the computation especially on the UE side which battery consumption is a critical factor related to operation being execute. In addition, the experimental result demonstrate that our schemes decreases the computation required to execute in the core network not sice it does not need to meet the HSS, therefore our schemes eliminate the possibility of HSS overflow problem.
